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Abstract
During World War I (1914{1918) the birth rates of countries such as France,
Germany, the U.K., Belgium and Italy declined by almost 50 percent. The
age structure of these countries' populations were signicantly aected for the
duration of the 20th century. In France, where the population was 40 millions
in 1914, the decit of births is estimated to 1.36 millions over 4 years while
military losses are estimated at 1.4 millions. In short, the fertility decline
doubled the demographic impact of the War. Why did fertility decline so
much? The conventional wisdom is that fertility fell below its optimal level
because of the absence of men gone to war. I challenge this view using the case
of France. I construct and calibrate a model of optimal fertility choice where
households reaching their childbearing years on the eve of WWI face a loss
of husband's income during the War as well as an increase in the probability
that the wife remains alone after the War. I calibrate this probability using
the casualties sustained by the French army. The model accounts for 97% of
the fertility decline even though it does not feature any physical separations of
couples. It also accounts for no less than half of the increase in fertility after
the War, and generates a temporary increase in the age at birth as observed
in the French data. This eect of the War on the optimal level of fertility is
robust to alternative calibrations.
Thanks to Patrick Festy for pointing out relevant data sources and sharing some of his own
data. Thanks to John Knowles and Juan Carrillo for useful discussions.
Department of Economics, KAP 316A, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA,
90089. Email: vandenbr@usc.edu.
1 Introduction
The First World War (WWI) lasted four years, from 1914 to 1918, and ravaged
European countries to an extent that had never been seen until then. During the War,
the birth rates of countries such as France, Germany, Belgium the United Kingdom
or Italy declined by about 50% {see Figure 1. In France, an estimated 1:36 million
children were not born because of this decline. This gure amounts to 3:4% of the
total French population in 1914 (40 millions), and is comparable to the military losses
which are estimated at 1:4 million men.1 In short, the fertility decline doubled the
already large demographic impact of the War.
What prompted such a decline of fertility? Answering this question will shed light on
a phenomenon that shaped the European demography for the rest of the Twentieth
century. The conventional wisdom is that, during the War, fertility fell below its
optimal level because of the absence of men gone to ght.2 I challenge this view
using the case of France. I develop a model of fertility choice where couples reaching
their childbearing years on the eve of World War I face a loss of husband's income
during the War as well as an increase in the probability that the wife remains the
sole adult in the household after the War. Calibrating this probability as the ratio of
military losses to the number of men mobilized, and using income data to calibrate a
husband's income loss during the War, the model accounts for 97% of the decline in
fertility during the War, even though it does not feature any physical separations of
couples. Abstracting from the loss of income during the War the model still accounts
1See Huber (1931, p. 413). Military losses include people killed and missing in action. They are
a lower bound on the death toll of the War since they do not include civilian losses.
2See, for example Huber (1931), Vincent (1946) and Festy (1984).
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for 87% of the decline. It also accounts for no less than half of the post-war fertility
increase and generates, as observed in the data, a temporary rise in the age at birth
after the War due to the postponement of fertility by the generation aected by the
War.
I develop a model of fertility choice where the unit of analysis is a nitely-lived
household which, at age 1, comprises two adults: a husband and a wife. The household
derives utility from consumption per member and the number of children it gives birth
to as well as from the number of adults. It can choose to have children at age 1 (20-25
in the data) and 2 (25-30 in the data), but children are costly. They require time,
goods, and a share of the total household's consumption for an exogenously given
number periods (childhood) during which they remain in the household. A husband
supplies his time inelastically to the market in exchange for a wage, while a wife
splits her time between the market, where she faces a lower wage than a husband,
and raising the children. There is a probability that, from age 2 onward, the wife
remains the only adult in the household with the children already born. A realization
of this event constitutes both a preference and an income shock for the household.
The quantitative strategy is the following. First, I calibrate the model's parameters to
t the time series of the French fertility rate from 1800 to the eve of World War I. That
is, I consider generations who entered their fertile years before the War broke out, so
I assume that the risk that a wife remains alone after age 1 is zero. Second, using
the calibrated parameters I compute the optimal choice of the generation exposed
to the War, i.e., a generation facing a partially-compensated loss of the husband's
income and a non-zero probability that the wife remains alone in the household from
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age 2 onward. I calibrate this probability using the ratio of casualties of the army
to the number of men mobilized. There are a few noteworthy results. First, the
War induces an age 1 household to save more and consume less than it would have
otherwise, thereby raising the marginal utility of its consumption. This results from
(i) the increased uncertainty due to the war; (ii) the reduction of expected income due
to the possibility that the wife remains alone and; (iii) the loss of contemporaneous
income due to the mobilization. The increase in the marginal utility of consumption
raises the cost of diverting resources away from consumption and toward raising
children. This eect is magnied by the fact that the expected marginal benet of a
child is lower when the expected number of adults in the household decreases. Thus,
the rst consequence of the War is a reduction of fertility for a young household, even
though the model does not feature a physical separation hindering its ability to have
children. Second, the War induces households to postpone giving birth. The reason is
as follows. Children born to an age-2 household are usually more expensive because
the opportunity cost of a child increases with the wage throughout a household's life.
But this cost is partly oset by the fact when a household who was young during
the War gives birth after the War it faces no more risk. Thus, a household can
trade-o risk for a higher cost of raising children. This inter temporal reallocation
of births implies an increase in the age at birth that is consistent with the French
data. Third, the generation aected by the war experiences a lower completed fertility
than it would have had in the absence of the War. This is because the income loss
experienced during the War makes this generation poorer so that, even after the War,
it is not optimal to completely oset the forgone fertility.
This paper contributes to an already large literature focusing on the determinants of
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fertility across countries and over time. Seminal work was done by Barro and Becker
(1988) and Barro and Becker (1989). Galor and Neil (2000) analyze the \-shaped
pattern of fertility over the long-run. Greenwood et al. (2005) propose of theory of
the baby boom in the United States. Jones et al. (2008) review alternative theories
explaining the negative relationship between income and fertility across countries and
over time. The eect of a war on fertility is explored, in the case of World War II and
the U.S. baby boom, by Doepke et al. (2007). Albanesi and Olivetti (2010) evaluate
the eects of technological improvements in maternal health. Jones and Schoonbroodt
(2011) theorize endogenous fertility cycles. Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) ask why do
fertility rates vary so much across countries? Bar and Leukhina (2010) investigate,
simultaneously, the demographic transition and the industrial revolution. Also related
is the work by Ohanian and McGrattan (2008): an example where economic theory
is used to investigate the eect of a war. In this case the authors evaluate the eect
of the scal shock that World War II represented for the U.S. economy. Finally,
Abramitzky et al. (2011) evaluate the impact of World War I on assortative matching
in the marriage market in France. Sommer (2009) shows that in the U.S. since the
1960s, the age at birth is increasing in the degree of labor market risk.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section I present facts relative to the
number of births and deaths during the War as well as to the composition of the
Army. I argue that, although the mobilization was large, even mobilized men might
have had the opportunity to have children. I also discuss relevant facts pertaining
to the marriage market and the situation of women during the War. In Section 3 I
develop the model and discuss the determinants of optimal fertility for a generation.
Section 4 presents the quantitative analysis of the model that is rst the calibration
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strategy, second the results of the main experiment, third the results of an experiment
decomposing the eects of the dierent factors aecting optimal fertility and, nally,
a set of experiments to evaluate the sensitivity of the main results to the choice of
some parameters. Section 5 concludes.
2 Facts
Some data are from the French census. The last census before the War was in 1911.
The rst census in the post-war era was in 1921. A census was scheduled in 1916 but
was cancelled. This data, and the data from previous censuses, were systematically
organized in the 1980s and made available from the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR). It is also available from the French National
Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee). Vital statistics are available
during the War years for the 77 regions (departements) not occupied by the Germans.
There was a total of 87 regions in France at the beginning of the War. Huber (1931)
provides a wealth of data on the french population before, during and after the war.
It also contains a useful set of income-related data.
2.1 Births and Deaths
The demographic impact of World War I in France was large and persistent. Consider
Figure 2, which shows the age and sex structure of the population before the War, in
1910, and after the War, in 1930, 1950 and 1970. The dierences between the pre-
and post-war population structures are quite noticeable. The rst eects of the War
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are visible in the 1930 panel. First, there is a decit of men (relative to women) in
the 30-50 age group. These are the men that fought during World War I and died.
Second, there is a decit of men and women in the teens. This is the generation that
should have been born during the War but was not because of the fertility decline.
The 1950 panel shows again the same phenomenon 20 years later. The men who died
at war should have been in the 50-70 age group, and the generation not born during
the War should have been in its thirties. Note also the decit of births that occurred
in the early 1940s, that is during World War II. What caused this? It could have been
that, as during World War I, individuals had less children because of World War II.
For the French, however, the impact of World War II was quite dierent than that of
World War I, possibly because the ghting did not last as long. In fact, the birth rate
in the 1940s shows a noticeable increase.3 Thus, births were low in the 1940s because
the generation that should have been in its childbearing period, say people of age 25
in 1940, should have been born in 1915, that is in the midst of World War I. This
generation was unusually small, so it gave birth to unusually little children despite
a high birth rate. So, the decit of births during World War I lead, mechanically,
to another decit in births 25 years later not because of a reduction in fertility, but
because of a reduction in the size of the fertile population. The 1970 panel shows
that, as late as in the seventies, the demographic impact of World War I is still quite
noticeable. The generation that should have been born during the War should, by
then, have reached its fties.
The rst month of World War I was August 1914, but the rst severe reduction in
3One can argue that the baby boom was already under way in the early 1940s in France. Green-
wood et al. (2005) propose of theory of the baby boom based on technical progress in the household.
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the number of live births occurred nine months later: it dropped from 46,450 in April
1915 to 29,042 in May {a 37% decline.4 During the course of the War the minimum
was attained in November 1915 when 21,047 live births were registered. The pre-
war level of births was reached again in December 1919. To put these numbers in
perspective consider Figure 3, which shows the number of births per month in France
and Germany from January 1906 until December 1921. The trend lines provide an
estimation of the number of births that would have realized if during the War the
trends that prevailed from 1906 to 1914 had remained. For France, the dierence
between the actual number of births and the trend, summed between May 1915 (9
months after the declaration of war) and August 1919 (9 months after the armistice),
yields an estimated 1.36 million children not born. This gure amounts to 3.4% of the
French population in 1914 (40 million) and is comparable to the total death toll of the
War for the French: 1.4 million.5 The estimate for Germany is 3.18 million children
not born. It amounts to 4.8% of the German population in 1911 (65 million) and
exceeds the number of military deaths estimated at 2 million.6 In short, the fertility
reduction that occurred during World War I doubled the demographic impact of
the War. Similar calculations, made by demographers, lead to comparable gures:
Vincent (1946) reports a decit of 1.6 million births because of the War and Festy
(1984) reports 1.4 million.
Was the decit of birth during the War compensated by excess fertility after the
War? To answer such question is dicult in the absence of a model of the trend in
the number of births before and after the War. Vincent (1946) argues that only half
4See Bunle (1954, Table XI, p. 309).
5See Huber (1931, p. 413).
6See Huber (1931, pp. 7 and 449).
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of the decit was made up for in the decade following the War. But, whether the
size of the French population was durably aected or not by the War is a separate
question from whether its age structure was. The answer to the latter question is a
denite yes.
It is interesting to compare the fertility reduction of the War to the so-called Baby
Boom. The drop in the birth rate between before the War (1913) and the trough
(1916) is 50% over 3 years. The Baby Boom started in 1941, when the birth rate was
13.1 and peaked in 1947 at 21.3. The dierence between the two gures is a 62%
increase over 6 years. By this measure the eect of World War I, on impact, is quite
large relative to that of the Baby Boom. Yet, the Baby Boom lasted longer than
World War I and, therefore, its nal eect on the French population is larger.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the case of France was not unique. This already
transpired in Figures 1 and 3. Figure 4 shows, in addition, the age and sex structure
of the populations of Germany, Belgium, Italy as well as Europe as a whole and the
United States in 1950. All European countries exhibit a decit of births during the
war which, as is the case for France, is still noticeable in the 1950 population. The
United States, on the contrary, were not noticeably aected by the War. The United
Kingdom appears to have experienced a reduced decit of births during World War
I compared with other European countries. Europe as a whole exhibits a noticeable
decit.
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2.2 The Army
The mobilization was massive. A total of 8.5 million men served in the French army
over the course of the War, while the size of the 20-50 male population is estimated
at 8.7 million on January 1st 1914. On August 1st 1914, the day of the mobilization,
the army counted already 1 million men. The remaining 7.5 million were called to
serve throughout the four years of the War.7
Not all the men serving in the army were sent to the front. On July 1st, 1915, there
were 5 million men in the army but 2.3 million of them served in the rear. These
men were serving in factories, public administrations and in the elds to help in the
production of food for the troops and the population.8 Between August 1914 and
November 1918, the fraction of men in the army actually serving in the rear remained
between 30 and 50%. The men in the rear were in touch with the civilian population
and, therefore, were more likely to have the opportunities to procreate than the men
at the front.
The combat troops did not spent all their time at the front either. Leaves from the
front were generalized in June 1915. Starting in October 1916 soldiers at the front
were granted 7 days of leave every 4 months, not including the time needed to travel
back to their families. These leaves could also be augmented at the discretion of one's
superior ocer. These leaves augmented the physical opportunities to have children.
7See Huber (1931, p. 89).
8See Huber (1931, p. 105).
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2.3 Women
Figure 5 shows evidence that the women reaching their childbearing years during
World War I postponed their childbearing decisions. This observation is important
to understand the behavior of fertility after the War. Fertility was above trend in the
immediate aftermath of the War because the generation that should have given birth
during the War years did so after, together with the young post-war generation. In
the model of Section 3 households are allowed to chose how many children to have in
2 periods of their lives to allow this mechanism to operate and assess its importance
for the post-war recovery of fertility.
Henry (1966) shows that the marriage market was noticeably perturbed for the gen-
erations reaching their marriage and childbearing years during World War I. Women
born in 1891-1895 (aged 21 in 1914) either got married before the War or after the
War. In the latter case, that is just after the War, the marriage rate of this generation
was abnormally high relative to the marriage rates of other generations at the same
age: a sign of \recuperation" of postponed marriages. A similar result holds true for
the generation of women born in 1896-1900. By some metric, however, the pertur-
bation of the marriage market due to World War I was \short-lived." Henry (1966)
reports that the proportion of single women, at the age of 50 for the 1891-1895 gen-
eration is 12.5% and for the 1896-1900 generation it is 11.9%. These gures compare
with similar gures for generations whose marriage decisions were not aected by the
War such as the 1851-1855 generation: 11.2% or the 1856-1860 generation: 11.3%.
Henry (1966) concludes that the replacement of the men killed during the War was
done through immigration and excess marriage rates for men who did not disappear
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during the War years. At this stage, two observations are worth making. First, al-
though ex-post (that is at the age of 50) the women from the 1891-1895 and 1896-1900
generations achieved the same marriage rate as the women from other generations,
from the perspective of 1914, when they had to decide whether to get married and
have children, the probability of keeping (or replacing) a husband must have appeared
quite dierent to them than to the previous generations at the same age. Second,
the disruption in the marriage market does not imply that births should be aected.
Although it is common, it is not necessary to be married to have children. Figure 6
shows that the proportion of out-of-wedlock births increased signicantly during the
War. Thus it seems reasonable, as a rst approximation, to study fertility behavior
abstracting from the marriage market.
Little information is available on female labor during the War. There was no ex-
haustive census available. Some were planned during the course of the War but
ended up being cancelled. Robert (2005) reports that the best information available
is from seven surveys conducted by work inspectors. These surveys did not cover
all branches of the economy such as railways and state-owned rms. However, data
are available for 40,000 to 50,000 establishments in food, chemicals, textile, book
production, clothing, leather, wood, building, metalwork, transport and commerce.
These establishments employed about 1.5 million workers before the War: about a
quarter of the labor force in industry and commerce. Robert (2005, Table 9.1) reports
the total number employed and the number of women employed in the establishments
surveyed. Although this is not the participation rate per se it gives a picture of female
labor during the War. The share of women worker was 30% in July 1914 and peaked
in January 1915 at 38.2%. It then declined slowly throughout the War and during
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the following years. It was 32% in July 1920. Downs (1995) and Schweitzer (2002)
emphasize that the increase in women's participation during the War is moderated
by the fact that most, that is between 80 and 95 percent, of the women who worked
during the War also worked in more feminized sectors before the War. Downs (1995,
page 48) writes
In the popular imagination, working women had stepped from domes-
tic obscurity to the center of production, and into the most tradition-
ally male of industries. In truth, the War brought thousands of women
from the obscurity of ill-paid and ill-regulated works as domestic servant,
weavers and dressmakers into the brief limelight of weapons production.
In the model of Section 3 a woman's labor is exogenous which, in light of the evidence
just presented, is a reasonable abstraction.
2.4 Similar Episodes
Caldwell (2004) presents evidence of fertility decline for a list of thirteen social
crises among which the English Civil War, Commonwealth and early Restoration,
the French Revolution, the American Civil War, World War I and the revolution
in Russia, the Spanish Civil War, the Military Coup and dictatorship in Chile, the
Portuguese revolution, etc... For each episode he reports signicant reductions in
fertility {see Table 1. He also reports that when fertility was already experiencing a
declining trend, the reductions observed during the periods of unrest are signicantly
more pronounced than before and after. For example, he reports that Spain's birth
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rate fell during the rst thirty-ve years of the 20th century but that during the Civil
War (1935-42) it fell by as much as during the previous 35 years. These observations
suggest that episodes of great uncertainty matter for fertility choices, even when men
might still be present in their household and have the physical opportunity to pro-
create. Thus, such observations question the importance of the mobilization through
the absence of men as the sole driver of the fertility decline during World War I.
3 The Model
3.1 The Environment
Time is discrete. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals
living for I + J periods: I as a child and J as an adult. When an individual becomes
an adult he leaves the household in which he was born, and pairs with another adult
of the same age and the opposite sex to form a new household of age 1. The marriage
and household formation processes are exogenous. Only households make decisions.
An age-1 household, that is a household formed by two individuals of age I +1, faces
the risk that only one adult remains at the beginning of age 2. There is no remaining
uncertainty from age 2 onward. Let (m) be the probability that a household com-
prises m adult members at the beginning of age 2. A household with a single adult
is headed by a woman, thus the interpretation of (1) is
(1) = Prf husband dies and wife does not remarry g
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and, therefore,
(2) = Prf husband survives or fhusband dies and wife remarriesg g:
Let mj denote the number of adults in a household of age j.
A household is fecund twice during its life. At age 1 it chooses how many children
to give birth to, b1, while facing risk with respect to its number of adults from age
2 onward. At age 2 it also chooses how many children to give birth to, b2, but all
uncertainty has been resolved. Thus, the household can smooth the eect of the War
by reallocating births through time.
Children born when the household is of age 1 remain present until it reaches age I.
Children born at age 2 remain until the household reaches age I +1. Thus, the stock
of children present in the household at age j, denoted by nj, is given by
nj = b1If1  j  Ig+ b2If2  j  I + 1g: (1)
A household's preferences are represented by
E1
(
JX
j=1
j 1

U

cj
mj + nj

+ V (nj;mj)
)
where E1 is the expectation operator, conditional on information available at age
1. The parameter  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, cj is total household
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consumption at age j. The parameter  is positive, and
U(x) =
x1 
1   and V (n;m) = (n
 +m)1=
with  > 0 and   1.
At this stage, a few observations are in order. First, a household values consumption
per member and not total consumption. Thus, one of the costs of having a child is a
reduction of consumption per member. Second, children of the same age (born in the
same period) and of dierent age (born in dierent periods) are perfect substitutes in
utility. Third, the degree of substitutability between children and adults depends on
, the value of which is disciplined by data in the quantitative exercise of Section 4.
When  = 1 children and adults are perfect substitutes. As  decreases children and
adults become more complementary. In the limit, as  !  1, children and adults
are perfect complement. The value of  is important for the eect of an exogenous
shock to the number of adults, m, on fertility. On the one hand, when children and
adults are perfect substitute, a reduction in the number of adults (when the husband
disappears at war) can be compensated by an increase in fertility, holding everything
else constant. On the other hand, when children and adults are complement, a
decrease in the number of adults implies a reduction of the optimal number of children.
Fourth, the number of adults acts as a preference shock through two channels: (i) a
reduction in the number of adults directly aects utility and, in particular, it reduces
the marginal utility of children through V ; (ii) a reduction in the number of adults
allows consumption per member to increase, holding everything else constant. In
what follows it transpires that a reduction to the number of adult also acts as an
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income shock.
Adults are endowed with one unit of productive time per period. A husband supplies
his time inelastically while a wife allocates hers between raising children and working.
A child requires  units of a wife's time and e units of the consumption good for each
period during which it is present in the household. The parameter  represents the
state of the \childrearing" technology and, therefore, is not a control variable. Thus,
a wife's time allocation is indirectly controlled through the number of children she
gives birth to. The wage rate for a husband is denoted wm and is assumed to grow
at the constant (gross) rate g > 1 per period. The wage rate for a wife is denoted wf
and is assumed to grow at rate g too. Thus, the labor income of a household can be
written writes as
wm

wf
wm
+m  1

  wfn
when there are m remaining adults, n children and wages are wm and wf . Note that
this amounts to wm + wf (1   n) when there are two adults and wf (1   n) when
only a wife remains. Let w denote the vector of wages
w =
 
wm; wf

:
A household has access to a one-period, risk-free bond with (gross) rate of interest
1=. It can freely borrow and lend any amount at this rate. It owns no assets at the
beginning of age 1.
The assumption that the household values consumption per member instead of to-
tal consumption is not innocuous. It aects the way the marginal cost of a child
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changes when the number of adult changes. To understand this, remember that the
marginal utility of consumption measures the cost of diverting resources away from
consumption and into childrearing. Suppose now that an adult member (the hus-
band) disappears. Then total consumption decreases and, if the household values
total consumption, the cost of a child increases by a magnitude dictated by the cur-
vature of U . If, instead, the household values consumption per member, this eect is
mitigated by the fact that the drop in total consumption together with a reduction
in the number of adults implies less of a reduction in consumption per member and,
therefore, less of an increase in the marginal cost of a child.
3.2 Optimization
3.2.1 Optimization Problem
A household's lifecycle is described in Figure 7. At age 1 it comprises 2 adults and
faces risk with respect to the number of remaining adults from the next period onward.
It must decide how to consume (c) and save (a0) as well as the number of children to
give birth to (b1). Hence, its optimization problem writes
max
c;b1;a0
U

c
2 + b1

+ V (b1; 2) + 
X
m0=1;2
W2 (a
0;m0; b1;w0) (m0) (2)
s.t. c+ a0 + b1
 
e+ wf

= wm + wf (3)
w0 =
 
gwm; gwf

:
The right-hand side of the budget constraint represents the \potential" labor income
of a household, i.e., the labor income it would receive if no time was devoted to raising
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children. The time cost of raising b1 children appears as an expenditure on the left-
hand side: wfb1. Thus, the eective labor income of a household is, as discussed
earlier, wm +wf (1  b1). The term 2+ b1 is the number of members in a household
at this age: 2 adults and b1 children. The function W2 (a
0;m0; b1;w0) is the value
function for a household of age 2 with a0 assets accumulated, b1 children born at age
1, m0 surviving adults and facing the vector of wage rates
 
gwm; gwf

. Note that in
this discussion of the age 1 optimization problem, the number of children born and
the number of children present in the household are the same since n1 = b1, as per
Equation (1).
At age 2 a household learns its number of adults, m, and decides to consume (c)
save (a0) and how many children to give birth to (b2). It is assumed that it can have
children only when a husband remains. The optimization problem writes
W2 (a;m; b1;w) = max
c;b2;a0
U

c
m+ b1 + b2

+ V (b1 + b2;m)
+ W3(a
0;m; b1; b2;w0) (4)
s.t. c+ a0 + (b1 + b2)
 
e+ wf

= wm

wf
wm
+m  1

+
a

(5)
w0 =
 
gwm; gwf

and b2 = 0 whenever m = 1. The functionW3(a
0;m; b1; b2;w) is the value function for
an age 3 household with a0 assets accumulated, m adult members, b1 children born
at age 1, b2 children born at age 2 and facing the vector of wage rates
 
gwm; gwf

.
Note that the household must keep track of the number of children born at age 1
and 2 in order to assess the childrearing cost it is facing each period, as well as to
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compute its size which is relevant for knowing consumption per member. Note also
that the right-hand side of the budget constraint represents total income: the sum
of \potential" labor income as well as income from assets accumulated during the
previous period. The time cost of raising the children present in the household at age
2 appears as an expenditure on the left-hand side. As per Equation (1) the number
of children present in the household at age 2 is n2 = b1 + b2.
From age 3 onward the household chooses consumption (c) and savings (a0). The
number of adults, m, is given and the number of children, nj, evolves in line with the
law of motion described by Equation (1).
Wj(a;m; b1; b2;w) = max
c;a0
U

c
m+ nj

+ V (nj;m)
+ Wj+1(a
0;m; b1; b2;w0) (6)
s.t. c+ a0 + nj
 
e+ wf

= wm

wf
wm
+m  1

+
a

(7)
nj given by Equation (1)
w0 =
 
gwm; gwf

and a0 = 0 when j = J .
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3.2.2 Optimality Conditions
At age 1 the rst order conditions for consumption, savings and fertility are
c : 0 =
@
@c
U

c
2 + b1

  
a0 : 0 = 
X
m0=1;2
@
@a0
W2(a
0;m0; b1;w0)(m0)  
b1 : 0 =
@
@b1
U

c
2 + b1

+ 
@
@b1
V (b1; 2)
+ 
X
m0=1;2
@
@b1
W2(a
0;m0; b1;w0)(m0)  
 
e+ wf

where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (3). These
conditions imply the Euler equation for assets:
U 0

c
2 + b1

1
2 + b1
= 
X
m0=1;2
@
@a0
W2(a
0;m0; b1;w0)(m0): (8)
Note that the marginal cost of a reduction in household consumption (left-hand side)
is the marginal utility of consumption per member of the household. The marginal
benet is the expected marginal gain at age 2, measured on the right-hand side of
the equation. The rst order condition for fertility can be rearranged as

@
@b1
V (b1; 2) + 
X
m0=1;2
@
@b1
W2(a
0;m0; b1;w0)(m0) =
U 0

c
2 + b1

1
2 + b1

e+ wf +
c
2 + b1

(9)
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where the left-hand side is the marginal benet of a child born at age 1, and the
right-hand side is the marginal cost. The marginal benet comprises two parts:
the instantaneous benet at age 1, measured by @V (b1; 2)=@b1, and the expected
marginal benet from age 2 onward measured by 
P
m0=1;2 @W2(a
0;m0; b1;w0)=@b1 
(m0). The marginal cost comprises three components: the consumption cost of
raising an additional child, e, the time cost that is the loss of some of the wife's labor
income, wf , and the allocation of a share of the household's consumption to the
child, c=(2 + b1). These three costs, expressed in consumption units, are weighted by
the marginal utility of consumption per member of the household at age 1.
There are two mechanisms through which the War aects fertility, the second magni-
fying the eect of the rst. First, the expected marginal benet of a child (left-hand
side of 9) decreases during the War. This is because the war implies a reduction of
the expected number of adults in the household from 2 to E(m) = 2  (1); and the
marginal benet of a child is increasing in the number of adults: Vnm > 0. When
the marginal cost of a child (right-hand side of 9) is increasing, the decrease in the
marginal benet implies a reduction in the optimal number of children. The second
reason why the War reduces optimal fertility is because it also implies an increase of
the marginal cost of raising a child. This increase occurs because consumption de-
creases and, therefore, the marginal utility of consumption increases, i.e. the cost of
diverting resources away from consumption and toward raising a child increases. The
decrease in consumption is the result of three separate causes: (i) a contemporaneous
loss of income due to the mobilization of the husband, i.e. is a decrease of wm; (ii)
an increase in savings due to the decrease in future expected income, i.e. a decrease
of E(m); and (iii) additional risk with respect to m. Since the marginal utility of a
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child is decreasing the optimal number of children born when the household is of age
1 decreases when the marginal cost increases.
At age 2, whenm = 2, the rst order conditions for consumption, savings and fertility
are
c : 0 =
@
@c
U

c
m+ b1 + b2

  
a0 : 0 = 
@
@a0
W3(a
0;m0; b1; b2;w0)  
b2 : 0 =
@
@b2
U

c
m+ b2 + b1

+ 
@
@b2
V (b1 + b2;m)
+ 
@
@b2
W3(a
0;m0; b1; b2;w0)  
 
e+ wf

where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (5). They
imply the Euler equation for assets:
U 0

c
m+ b1 + b2

1
m+ b1 + b2
= 
@
@a0
W3(a
0;m0; b1; b2;w0): (10)
and the following condition for b2

@
@b2
V (b1 + b2;m) + 
@
@b2
W3(a
0;m0; b1; b2;w0) =
U 0

c
m+ b1 + b2

1
m+ b1 + b2

e+ wf +
c
m+ b1 + b2

: (11)
Equations (10) and (11) have the same interpretations as Equations (8) and (9), with
the dierence that the household does not face any remaining uncertainty at age 2.
When m = 1 the household cannot give births to children, therefore b2 = 0.
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At age 3 and above the only choice faced by the household is that of consumption
and savings. The optimality conditions are
c : 0 =
@
@c
U

c
m+ nj

  
a0 : 0 = 
@
@a0
Wj+1(a
0;m; b1; b2;w0)  ;
implying the following Euler equation:
U 0

cj
m+ nj

1
m+ nj
= U 0

cj+1
m+ nj+1

1
m+ nj+1
:
Thus, the household maintains the marginal utility of consumption per member con-
stant from one period to the next. This implies constant consumption across periods
where the number of members in the household remains constant. At age J the
optimal saving is a0 = 0.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I calibrate the model to t the time series of the French fertility rate
from 1800 until the eve of World War I. Using the calibrated parameters, I conduct two
experiments where I compute the optimal decisions of the generation facing the War.
In the rst experiment this generation experiences two shocks that its predecessors
did not: a higher risk that the wife remains alone in the household after age 1, and a
loss of husband's income during the war years. In the second experiment I abstract
from the loss of husband's income but keep the higher risk that the wife remains alone
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to provides a quantitative decomposition of the contribution of the two shocks. I also
discuss the sensitivity of the results with respect to the choice of some parameters.
4.1 Calibration
Amodel period is 5 years. Thus, an individual of age 1 in the model can be interpreted
as a child between the age of 0 and 5 in the data. Let I = 4 and J = 7 so that an
individual remains in the household in which he was born until he reaches the age of
15-20, and a young household is composed of two individuals between the age of 20
and 25. Households in the model have their children in the rst and second period
of their adult lives, which correspond to their 20s in the data. Life ends between the
age of 50 and 55.
Let the rate of interest on the risk free asset be 4 percent per year. This implies a
subjective discount factor  = 1:04 5. For the rate of growth of wm and wf I use the
rate of growth of the Gross National Product per capita: 1:6 percent per year {see
Carre et al. (1976, Tables 1.1 and 2.3). Thus, g = 1:0165. Huber (1931, pp. 932-
935) reports gures for the daily wages for men and women in agriculture, industry
and commerce in 1913. In industry a woman's wage in 1913 was 52% of a man's.
In agriculture the gap was 64%, and in commerce it was 77%. Since commerce was
noticeably smaller than agriculture and industry I use wf=wm = 0:6. The initial value
for wm is normalized to 1. In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to
wf=wm. Note that a gender gap in earnings of 60% is consistent with the ndings of
the more recent literature studying the United States. Blau and Kahn (2006, Figure
2.1) report that women working full-time earned between 55% and 65% of what men
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earned from the 1950s to the 1980s. Knowles (2010) reports that, throughout the
1960s, the ratio of mean wages of women to those of men was slightly below 60% in
the U.S.
Let  = (; ; ; )0 be the vector of remaining parameters where the rst three
elements are preference parameters and  is the time-cost of a child. They are chosen
in order to solve the following minimization problem:
min

X
t2I
(ft()  ft)2 + (  n1911()  0:1)2 (12)
where I is an index set: I = f1806; 1811; 1816; : : : ; 1911g. This objective function
deserves a few comments. First, ft() is the fertility rate implied by the model for a
given value of . Since women in households of age 1 and 2 give births at each date,
ft() is the sum of births from these two generations at date t, divided by 2. Second, ft
is the empirical counterpart of ft(). It is constructed from birth rates from Mitchell
(1998) as well as fertility data from the French National Institute for Statistics and
Economic Studies (Insee). The birth rate, that is the number of birth per population
is a dierent measure of fertility than the fertility rate which is the number of birth per
fertile women. The latter is the empirical counterpart of the decisions of households
of age 1 and 2 in the model. The French fertility rate, unfortunately, is not available
before 1900 while Mitchell's data goes back to 1800. After splicing the two series
together in 1900, however, one can verify that their behavior is quite close on the
period over which they overlap.9 I use this constructed time series to calibrate the
model and evaluate the eect of the War. Third, n1911() is the total number of
9Data available upon request.
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children born to the 1911 generation, that is the last generation not aected by the
War. Thus, the second part of the objective function is the distance between the
time spent by this generation raising its children and its empirical counterpart, 10%.
The latter gure comes from Aguiar and Hurst (2007, Table II). They report that in
the 1960s a woman in the U.S. spends close to 6 hours per week on various aspect
of childcare, that is primary, educational and recreational. This amounts to 10% of
the sum of market work, non-market work and childcare (61 hours). Thus,  is set
to imply that the time spent by a women on childcare, on the eve of the War, is 10%
as well. The good cost of raising a child is assumed to be zero, i.e., e = 0. Note that
if e was proportional to wf that is, if the good cost of raising a child was growing
at rate g, then setting e to 0 would be innocuous since e could be subsumed into  .
In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to the target gure for the
time cost of raising a child. Finally, note that for this minimization I assume that
(1) = 0, i.e., the pre-war generations do not face a risk relative to the presence of
the husband from age 2 onward.
Although , ,  and  are determined simultaneously, some aspects of the data are
more important than others for some parameters. The level of fertility, in particular,
is critical to discipline the parameter  which measures the intensity of a household's
taste for children. The time cost of a child, that is 10% of a woman's time, is critical
in determining the value of  . The parameter  determines the curvature of the
marginal utility of consumption and, since the number of adults in a household in
constant, the parameter  determines the curvature of the marginal utility of fertility.
Thus the decline in fertility which results from a comparison between its marginal
cost (partly driven by the marginal utility of consumption) and its marginal benet,
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disciplines the parameters  and .
The calibrated parameters are displayed in Table 2. Figure 8 displays the computed
and actual fertility rate for the pre-war period. The model ts the data well. It
generates a downward trend in the birth rate due to the rising opportunity cost of
raising children when the wage rate increases. The model also generates a moderate
downward trend in the age at birth, as observed in the data of Figure 5 before the
War. The cause of this decline is that, as the wage rate increases, the cost of raising a
child born to a household of age 2 increases faster relative to the cost of a child born
to a household of age 1. Thus, households tend to give birth earlier in their lives:
the 1806 generation, gives births to 70% of all its children at age 1. For the 1911
generation, this gure is 71%. It is this changing intertemporal allocation of births
across generations which reduces the age at birth in the model.
4.2 Main Experiment
The last generation not aected by the War in the model is the generation reaching
adulthood in 1911. The next generation reaches adulthood in 1916. It diers from its
predecessors because (i) its women are more likely to remain alone after age 1, that
is (1) > 0 for this generation and (ii) its households experience a loss of husbands
income during the war, that is wm is below trend for one period.
I calibrate (1) as
(1) =
military losses of World War I
total men mobilized
:
The military losses where 1:4 millions while 8:5 million men were mobilized. Thus, I
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used (1) = 1:4=8:5 = 0:16. The following generation in the model reaches adulthood
in 1921 and, therefore, faces (1) = 0 as the pre-war generations. The gure used
for (1) is not perfect. On the one hand it might exaggerate the risk from the
perspective of a wife since she has the possibility of remarrying after the War if her
husband dies. This possibility would allow a wife to raise her children with hers and
another husband's income. On the other hand the probability may underestimate
the risk since the husband may survive the War but come home disabled. In the case
of World War I this was a distinct possibility since the massive use of artillery and
gases made this conict quite dierent from any other conicts before. Huber (1931,
p. 448) reports 4.2 million wounded during the War: half of the men mobilized. The
number of invalid was 1.1 million among which 130,000 were mutilated and 60,000
were amputated. In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to (1) to
address these concerns.
Men did not get fully compensated for income while they were mobilized. Downs
(1995) cites a compensation amounting to somewhere between 35 and 60% of a man's
pre-war salary in agriculture or industry.10 To represent this loss, I let wm be 50%
of what it would have been for the men of this generation had the War not broken
out. This drop is temporary: i.e. only at age 1 for this generation. Thus, if there
is a husband in the household from age 2 onward, wm will be as prescribed by the
constant-growth trend that prevailed before the War. Formally, the age 1 budget
constraint for the 1916 generation, that is Equation (3), is replaced with
c+ a0 + b1
 
e+ wf

= 0:5 wm + wf :
10See Downs (1995, p. 49) and Huber (1931, pp. 932-935).
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In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to the magnitude of the income
loss of the husband.
Figure 9 shows the result of the experiment. The fertility rate falls by 48% in 1916
in the model versus 49% in the data. Thus the model accounts for 48=49 = 97%
of the decline of the birth rate observed in the French data. After the War fertility
increases by 66% in the model versus 118% in the data. Thus the model accounts for
66=118 = 56% of the increase in fertility in the aftermath of the War. This increase
in fertility after the War has two components. First, the young households of 1921
(the rst post-war generation in the model) do not face the risk and income loss faced
by the 1916 generation. Hence they do not need to lower their age-1 consumption
and, therefore, they face a lower cost of raising children. So, this generation has
an age-1 fertility that is consistent with the trend that prevailed before the War
broke out. Second, the 1916 generation gives birth to an unusually low number of
children in 1921. This is because, despite the fact that uncertainty has been resolved,
this generation is poorer than its predecessor because of the temporary income loss
incurred during the War. The low number of children born to the 1916 generation in
1921 is the reason why the 1921 fertility gure is not back on trend.
Although the 1916 generation gives birth to few children in 1921, its intertemporal
allocation of births diers noticeably from its predecessors. For the members of this
generation that were able to have children after the War, only 56% of their total
fertility was completed during the War, when they were of age 1. This compares with
the pre- and post-war generations, who completed 71% of their fertility at age 1. This
dierent allocation implies a temporary increase in the age at birth that is consistent
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with the pattern observed in the data of gure 5.
This exercise shows that the combination of a husband's mobilization, i.e., his inability
to earn income during the War, and the likelihood that his wife might remains alone
after age 1 are enough to account for all the decline in fertility during the war, and no
less than half of the catch-up in its aftermath. Note again that although the husband
is unable to receive income during the War, there are no physical separations of
couples in the model.
4.3 Decomposition
What is the relative contribution of the two shocks faced by households to the fer-
tility decline. That is, how important was the temporary income loss due to the
mobilization versus the risk and expected income loss due to the killings? To answer
this question, consider two counterfactual experiments. In the rst, the only shock
aecting the 1916 generation is the increase of (1). That is, this generation faces
increased income risk and lower expected income after age 1, but no contemporane-
ous loss of income at age 1 during the War. In the second experiment the only shock
aecting the 1916 generation is the loss of income due to the mobilization, but there
is no change in the probability (1).
Figure 10 shows the result of the rst counterfactual experiment. The fertility rate
falls by 43% in 1916 in the model versus 49% in the data. Thus, the increase in
(1) alone accounts for 43=49 = 87% of the decline of the birth rate observed in the
French data. After the War fertility increases by 105% in the model versus 118%
in the data. Thus the model accounts, in this experiment, for 105=118 = 89% of
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the increase in fertility in the aftermath of the War. As in Section 4.2 the increase
in fertility after the War has two components. First, the young household in 1921
has an age-1 fertility that is consistent with the trend that prevailed before the War.
Second, and contrary to the result of Section 4.2, the 1916 generation gives birth
to an unusually large number of children in 1921. This is because it signicantly
postponed its fertility during the War, but did not suer any income loss as in the
main experiment of Section 4.2. For the members of this generation that were able to
have children after the War, only 36% of their total fertility was completed during the
War, when they were of age 1 (v. 56% in the previous experiment). It is interesting to
note that in this experiment, the post-war level of fertility is above trend. Thus, the
ability of households to postpone their fertility, combined with a moderate income
loss during the War would be able to replicate the increase of actual fertility above
its trend.
To summarize, this experiment shows that the bulk of the fertility decline during the
War is accounted for by the increased income risk and lower expected income faced by
the 1916 generation. The temporary income loss of mobilized men was a signicant
contributor to the fertility decline but its quantitative contribution was less than that
of (1).
4.4 Sensitivity
I consider alternative values for (i) the probability that a woman remains alone after
age 1, (1); (ii) the magnitude of the husband's income loss during the War; (iii) the
time cost of raising children; and (iv) the gender wage gap in earnings.
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a - Sensitivity to (1), the Risk that a Wife Remains Alone after World War I
Consider two alternative values for (1), the probability that a woman in the 1916
generation remains alone in her household after the War. The rst is (1) = 0:1
instead of 0.16 in the baseline. The second is (1) = 0:2. In both cases the baseline
experiment of Section 4.2 is performed with the new value for (1). Table 3 reports
the results. It transpires that the probability (1) matters noticeably for the results
of the exercise but that, even in the conservative case where the risk for a wife to
remain alone is 10%, the model still accounts for 79% of the actual decline in fertility
(v. 97% in the baseline). In the case where the probability is 20%, the model accounts
for 104% of the decline.
b - Sensitivity the Income Loss of a Husband During World War I
In the experiment of Section 4.2 a husband's loses 50% of its income because of
mobilization. I consider two alternative values: one where the loss of income is 25%
and one where it is 75%. Performing the same experiment as in Section 4.2 with these
values implies results that are reported in Table 4. As the income loss gets smaller, the
model accounts for a smaller proportion of the actual decline and a larger proportion
of the actual increase in fertility. In the case of an income loss of 25% during the
war, the model accounts for 92% (v. 97% in the baseline) of the decline in fertility
during the War, and 73% (v. 56% in the baseline) of the post-war increase. When the
income loss is 75% the model accounts for 103% and 40% of the decline an increase,
respectively.
c - Sensitivity to the Time Cost of Raising a Child
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Consider now alternative targets for the time cost of raising children. For each new
value the model needs to be calibrated again, in exactly the same fashion as in Section
4.1 with the exception of the target in the second component of the objective function
(12). Then the experiment of Section 4.2 is performed. I consider two alternative
targets: a time cost of 5% and a time cost of 20%. The results are displayed in Table 5.
There are two observations worth making here. First, the model's worst performance
remains quite high: it accounts for no less than 75% of the decline in fertility during
the war (v. 97 in the baseline) and no less than 27% of the increase after (v. 56 in the
baseline). Second, the fraction of decline accounted for by the model rises as the time
cost of a child decreases. This may appear \counter-intuitive" as one might expect
the eect of the war to be dampened when children are less costly. The reason for this
result is that, as the target gure for the time cost of a child changes, other parameters
change too. In particular, a lower time cost of raising a child implies, through the
calibration procedure, a lower value for : This can be understood as follows: as the
opportunity cost of raising a child decreases the marginal cost decreases too. Since
the model is calibrated to t the data, marginal cost and marginal benet must be
equalized at the same fertility level. This implies that the marginal benet of a child
must also decrease, which is achieve through lower values for  and . Lower values
for , however, imply more complementarity between adults and children in utility.
This, in turn, makes the war more costly. In the results of Table 5, this eect is
stronger that the eect from the reduction in the cost of a child.
Another experiment with respect to the time cost of children consists in changing 
without recalibrating the model. In this case the time series of fertility will not t the
data, but conclusions can be drawn from the change in fertility during the War. In
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the case where  is divided by two relative to its baseline value, the change in fertility
during the War is 77% of the data (v. 97 in the baseline), and the increase after
the War is 36% of the data (v. 56 in the baseline). If  is set at twice its baseline
value the model accounts for 130% and 115% of the changes in fertility during and
after the War. Thus, the eect of the War is indeed increasing in the time cost of
raising a child. However, even with a time cost parameter twice as little as in the
baseline calibration the model still accounts for more than half of the changes in
fertility during the War.
d - Sensitivity to wf=wm, the Gender Earning Gap
In Table 6 I perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to wm=wf , the gender earning
gap. I consider two alternative values: 40 and 80%. As for the sensitivity analysis
with respect to  , the model's paramaters are calibrated again for each alternative
value of wm=wf and the experiment of Section 4.2 is performed. The eect of the
War on fertility is large in all these experiments: the model accounts for no less than
88% of the decline in fertility and no less than 43% of the increase after the War.
5 Conclusion
The human losses of World War I were not only on the battleeld. In France, the
number of children not born during the War was as large as military casualties (larger
in the case of Germany). The age structure of population in France and other Euro-
pean countries was signicantly changed by this event, and the eect lasted for the
entire twentieth century. In this paper I argue that this phenomenon was for a large
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part, that is between 87 and 97%, the optimal reaction of generations exposed to the
eects of the War, namely the loss of income for a husband during the War, and the
risk that a wife remains alone in her household at the end of the War. These two
mechanisms alone can also account for the rise of fertility after the War. The physical
separation of couples which is often cited to explain the fertility decline during the
War may have been a factor of secondary importance. This nding is consistent with
a general pattern exhibited by fertility, across countries and over time, i.e., it tends
to decline during periods of signicant unrest even though there may be no physical
separations of couples.
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Table 1: Changes in Fertility for Countries Experiencing Major Social Upheavals
Country Episode Period Change in CBR (%)
England Civil War, Commonwealth,
and early Restoration 1641-66  17:3
France Revolution 1787-1804  22:5
USA Civil War 1860-70  12:8
Russia WWI and Revolution 1913-21  24:4
Germany War, revolution, defeat, ination 1913-1924  26:1
Austria War, defeat, empire dismembered 1913-24  26:9
Spain Civil war and dictatorship 1935-42  21:4
Germany War, defeat, occupation 1938-50  17:3
Japan War, defeat, occupation 1940-55  34:0
Chile Military coup and dictatorship 1972-78  22:3
Portugal Revolution 1973-85  33:3
Spain Dictatorship to democracy 1976-85  37:2
Eastern Europe Communism to capitalism 1986-98
Russia  56:0
Poland  40:0
Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic)  38:0
Source: Caldwell (2004, Table 1).
Note: CBR is Crude Birth Rate.
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Table 2: Calibration
Preferences  = 1:04 5,  = 0:44,  =  0:24,  = 0:90
Wages w = 1 for initial generation, g = 1:0165
Cost of children  = 1:82, e = 0
Gender wage gap  = 0:6
Demography I = 4, J = 7
Table 3: Sensitivity to (1), the Risk that a Wife Remains Alone in her Household
after World War I
%age of decline %age of increase
(1) = 0:10 79 27
(1) = 0:16 (baseline) 97 56
(1) = 0:20 104 68
Note: The rst column reports the percentage of the fertility decline during the War that is accounted
for in the experiment. The second column reports the percentage of the fertility increase after the
War that is accounted for.
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Table 4: Sensitivity the Income Loss of a Husband During World War I
%age of decline %age of increase
25% 92 73
50% (baseline) 97 56
75% 103 40
Note: The rst column reports the percentage of the fertility decline during the War that is accounted
for in the experiment. The second column reports the percentage of the fertility increase after the
War that is accounted for.
Table 5: Sensitivity to the Time Cost of Raising a Child
Time cost %age of decline %age of increase
5% 103 69
10% (baseline) 97 56
20% 75 27
Note: The rst column reports the percentage of the fertility decline during the War that is accounted
for in the experiment. The second column reports the percentage of the fertility increase after the
War that is accounted for.
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Table 6: Sensitivity to wf=wm, the Gender Earning Gap
%age of decline %age of increase
wf=wm = 0:4 111 81
wf=wm = 0:6 (baseline) 97 56
wf=wm = 0:8 88 43
Note: The rst column reports the percentage of the fertility decline during the War that is accounted
for in the experiment. The second column reports the percentage of the fertility increase after the
War that is accounted for.
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Figure 1: Birth Rates in Some European Countries
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Figure 2: French Population by Age and Sex, January 1, Selected Years
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Figure 3: Number of Births per Month in France and Germany
Note: The source of data is Bunle (1954, Table XI). The linear trends are estimated using the data
from January 1906 until July 1914. The shaded area is from May 1915, that is 9 months after the
declaration of War between France and Germany in August 1914, until August 1919 that is 9 months
after the armistice was signed in November 1918.
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Figure 4: Population by Age and Sex, Selected Countries, 1950
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Figure 5: Average and Median Age at Birth in France
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Figure 6: Proportion of Out-of-Wedlock Live Births in France
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Figure 7: Timing of Events and Decisions
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Figure 8: Calibration: Fertility Rate in France, Model and Data
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Note: This gure displays the result of the calibration procedure where the model parameters are
chosen to t the time series of fertility during the pre-war period. The probability that a wife
remains alone in a household is 0 for all generations.
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Figure 9: Baseline Model: Fertility Rate in France, Model and Data
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Note: In this experiment the generation aected by the War faces both an increased probability
that a wife remains alone after age 1 and a temporary loss of a husband's income during the War.
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Figure 10: Counterfactual Experiment 1: Fertility Rate in France, Model and Data
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Note: In this experiment the generation aected by the War faces an increased probability that a
wife remains alone after age 1. There is no temporary loss of a husband's income during the War.
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